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Abstract 
A broad range of questions at various instances in the legal process can be 
stated and analysed in terms of formal decision theoretic models, with 
results conveyed in graphical terms, such as decision trees. However, the 
real-world decision problems encountered by the participants of a legal 
process, including judges, prosecutors and attorneys, present challenging 
features, such as multiple competing propositions, variable costs and 
uncertain process outcomes. This complicates decision theoretic 
computations and the use of diagrammatic devices such as decision trees 
which mainly provide static views of selected features of a given problem. 
Yet, the issues are inherently dynamic, and the complexity of strategic 
planning and assessing legal tactics – given a party’s standpoint – increases 
even further when considerations are extended to information provided by 
forensic science services. This is because introducing results of forensic 
examinations may impact on the probability of various trial outcomes and 
hence crucially impact on a party’s interests. In this paper, we analyse and 
discuss examples of decision problems at the interface of the law and 
forensic science using influence diagrams (i.e., Bayesian decision 
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networks). Such models, hereafter called normative decision support 
structures, can be operationally implemented through commercially and 
academically available software systems. These normative decision 
support structures represent core computational models that can be 
integrated as part of decision and litigation support systems, to help the 
participants of a legal process answer a variety of questions regarding 
complex strategic decisions.    
Keywords 
Decision theory, forensic science, dispute resolution, legal negotiation, 
Bayesian decision networks, normative decision policies, sequential 
decisions  
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1 Introduction 
In light of the ever-increasing intricacy of legal practices, sound methodology to 
support thinking and making decisions in practical cases is a topic of interest for 
both researchers and practitioners. The central aspects of a given civil or criminal 
case, in particular those over which disagreement exists, need to be thought 
about in a structured way to enable insight and improve communication between 
various participants in the legal process. This includes lawyer and client 
relationships as well as the relationship between adversarial parties at trial. 
Methodologies for analysing legal cases, and their implementation, are pivotal 
topics for both practitioners and academics, because of the need to cope 
coherently with the problem of decision-making under uncertainty. For example, 
a party may need to decide whether to settle or plead guilty, whether to go to 
trial or how to allocate resources (e.g., to the search of further information). Such 
decisions place a party’s wealth, welfare or personal liberty at stake, and 
attorneys must thus formulate legal tactics that appropriately reflect the party’s 
preferences for or aversion to process outcomes. In litigation law, for example, 
factors such as the costs of going to trial, and the uncertainties about possible 
outcomes (verdicts) all need to be dealt with in a coherent whole. Such questions 
involve all the ingredients of classic decision theory: feasible decisions, uncertain 
states of nature, consequences (i.e., combinations of decisions and states of 
nature) and a valuation of the desirability (or, worth) of consequences. 1 Decision 
theory is strongly rooted in economics2 and, following developments by several 
leading business school groups in the middle of the last century, it has also 
                                                 
1  E.g., Howard Raiffa, Decision Analysis, Introductory Lectures on Choices under Uncertainty 
(Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1968); Howard Raiffa and Robert Schlaifer, Applied 
Statistical Decision Theory (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1961). 
2  John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, 3rd ed. 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953). 
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stimulated interest in the legal arena.3 This interest has steadily increased and has 
been further strengthened, mainly since the 1980s, by the development of widely 
available computer systems capable of processing the mathematical form of legal 
decision models.4 Such systems are not intended to replace various decision-
makers in the legal process nor do such concepts claim to offer a comprehensive 
descriptive account of the various aspects of the legal process that they seek to 
model. Instead, such systems should best be considered as decision support 
devices to assist in the analysis of selected aspects of the densely connected 
network of factors upon which the outcomes of a case depend, at the level of 
detail that the user considers appropriate. Thus, they offer a normative 
perspective in the sense further discussed below. 
The prototypical questions that have attracted wide interest among 
decision-theoretic researchers and legal scholars relate to the conviction or 
acquittal of defendants in the criminal trial, and the determination of the liability 
of defendants in civil lawsuits. These are important but far end points of legal 
processes. Decision theory, however, is a general theory for analysing how an 
individual, facing the question of what decision to make in situations of 
uncertainty, should proceed so as to insure coherence with that person’s 
judgments and preferences among possible decision outcomes.5 In this paper, we 
build on existing works on decision theory for strategic questions arising in the 
legal context and then develop two extensions. The first is a translation of the 
                                                 
3  Alan Cullison, “Probability Analysis of Judicial Fact-Finding: A Preliminary Outline of the 
Subjective Approach” (1969) 1 University of Toledo Law Review pp. 538-698; John Kaplan, 
“Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process” (1968) 20(6) Stanford Law Review 1065-1092. 
4  Stuart Nagel, Microcomputers as Decision Aids in Law Practice (New York: Quorum Books, 1987); 
Stuart Nagel, Decision-Aiding Software and Legal Decision-Making: A Guide to Skills and 
Applications Throughout the Law (New York: Quorum Books, 1989). 
5  Ronald Howard, “Decision Analysis and Law” in Marilyn Mac Crimmon and Peter Tillers 
(eds.), The Dynamics of Judicial Proof. Computation, Logic, and Common Sense (New York: 
Springer, 2002), pp. 261-269. 
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standard model of legal negotiations, commonly represented in terms of decision 
trees,6 into Bayesian decision networks, also sometimes called influence 
diagrams.7 Bayesian decision networks are a highly flexible modelling 
environment that can be implemented using academically and commercially 
available software systems. The second extension concerns results of forensic 
examinations that may have an impact on trial outcomes, or intermediate steps 
in the legal process. To operate this second extension, we will take advantage of 
the fact that the use of graphical models, such as Bayesian networks and Bayesian 
decision networks, is already a well-established area of research for analysing the 
probative strength of forensic science results.8 Thus, the question of how to 
logically connect reasoning models for legal negotiations and forensic results is 
an area which offers much room for fundamental research.  
By choosing decision-theoretic graphical models we emphasise that the 
analyses pursued in this paper are normative,9 i.e. focusing on explicit reference 
points against which one can compare one’s reasoning and conclusions in 
practical situations that require a decision to be made.10 Stated otherwise, we will 
not deal with the empirical question of whether people’s actual behaviour 
conforms to the normative account of decision-making. There is, in fact, 
substantial evidence that people’s intuitive and unaided reasoning generally 
diverges from normative standards.11 While descriptive research is important to 
                                                 
6  E.g., Howard Raiffa, The Art and Science of Negotiation, How to Resolve Conflicts and Get the Best 
out of Bargaining (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1982). 
7  Uffe Kjærulff and Anders Madsen, Bayesian Networks and Influence Diagrams, A Guide to 
Construction and Analysis (New York: Springer, 2008). 
8  Franco Taroni et al., Bayesian Networks for Probabilistic Inference and Decision Analysis in Forensic 
Science, 2nd ed., (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 2014). 
9  Dennis Lindley, Making Decisions, 2nd ed. (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1985). 
10  Johnathan Baron, Thinking and Deciding (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008, 4th 
ed.). 
11  E.g., Terry Connolly, “Decision Theory, Reasonable Doubt, and the Utility of Erroneous 
Acquittals” (1987) 11(2) Law and Human Behaviour 101-112; Gregory Jones and Douglas Yarn, 
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assess the extent to which people think and act coherently, we maintain that this 
can only be achieved if the normative standpoints are first clarified (against 
which observable behaviour can be compared), and this is what the normative 
decision-theoretic structures developed throughout this paper seek to achieve. 
We will call our models computational normative decision support structures 
because our analyses, using formal approaches, focus on the conceptual 
relationship between traditional interpretation of forensic science results and 
strategic analysis in legal proceedings.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly introduces the 
graphical models for decision-theoretic analyses used in later parts of the paper, 
i.e. decision trees and Bayesian decision networks (influence diagrams), using a 
general example of plea bargaining from the defendant’s point of view. Readers 
well acquainted with these concepts may skip this section. Section 3 starts with 
an outline of how to state the general model of legal negotiations in terms of a 
Bayesian decision network. Extensions regarding litigation costs, uncertainty 
factors affecting these costs and other elements characterising the decision 
problem are added gradually, with all decision-theoretic computations outlined. 
It will be shown that Bayesian decision networks allow one to deal with formal 
decision-theoretic calculations and incorporate notions such as perfect and 
partial information. Section 3 will also outline the model structures to deal with 
the results of forensic examinations and the connection of these models with the 
standard models for decision analysis in the legal context, using the notions of 
sequential decision analysis and normative decision policies. Discussion and 
conclusions will be presented in Section 4.  
                                                 
“Evaluative Dispute Resolution Under Uncertainty: An Empirical Look at Bayes’ Theorem 
and the Expected Value of Perfect Information” (2003) 2 Journal of Dispute Resolution 427-461; 
Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (London: Penguin, 2011). 
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2 Methods and notation 
2.1 Decision trees 
Decision trees are a general method to capture and convey the basic components 
of a decision problem. For the purpose of illustration, imagine a defendant 
(assisted by an attorney) who must decide between two actions. Denote them 𝑑1, 
accepting a plea of guilty on a reduced charge, and 𝑑2, letting the case go to trial. 
Other decision cases will be studied in the main part of the paper (Section 3). 
When making a decision, there may be uncertainty about the state of nature, 
current or future. In the situation faced by the defendant, there may be 
uncertainty about the trial outcome if he decides 𝑑2, i.e. going to court instead of 
accepting a plea agreement (𝑑1). Let the two future legal conclusions (verdicts), 
about which the defendant is uncertain at the time of deciding between 𝑑1 and 
𝑑2, be denoted 𝜃1, for “guilty”, and  𝜃2, for “not guilty”. Note that here the focus 
is on uncertainty about the legal conclusion that will be reached when applying 
the law to the facts of the case. Such uncertainty cannot be eliminated, but it can 
be measured by means of probabilities.12 We are not concerned here with the 
various events that may have happened and that will form the basis for reaching 
a conclusion at trial. This relates to another decision process by another decision-
                                                 
12  In the context of evaluating the impact of evidence, the proposition “the defendant committed 
the crime” is sometimes referred to, colloquially, as the “guilt hypothesis”. This has been 
criticised as confusing (e.g., Ronald Allen, “Rationality, Algorithms and Juridical Proof: a 
Preliminary Inquiry” (1997) 1 The International Journal of Evidence & Proof 254-275; Stephen 
Fienberg, “Theories of Legal Evidence: What Properties Should They Ideally Possess and 
when are they Informative?” (1997) 1 The International Journal of Evidence & Proof 309-312) 
because, strictly speaking, guilt is not a hypothesis, but a decision reached based on the 
consideration of the proposition according to which the defendant is the offender. We agree 
with this view. In our decision analysis pursued here, a court’s decision is considered an 
uncertain state of nature for which a participant in the legal process (e.g., the defendant) may 
assign probabilities. Hence, we are not modelling the trial decision, but the decision of what 
to do from the point of view of a participant (party) in the legal process.  
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maker (e.g., the court), which is different from the viewpoint of the defendant 
studied here.  
Deciding 𝑑𝑖 in light of a state of nature 𝜃𝑗  leads to a consequence 𝐶𝑖𝑗. Thus, 
in the hypothetical case considered here, 𝐶21 is the consequence of taking the case 
to trial (𝑑2) with the outcome that the accused is found guilty at the end of the 
trial (𝜃1), whereas 𝐶22 is the consequence of taking the case to trial (𝑑2) with the 
outcome that the accused is found not guilty at the end of the trial (𝜃2). Note that 
when taking 𝑑1, accepting the plea on a reduce charge, there is only a single 
consequence, 𝐶1∙, that is the reduced charge as defined in advance. In particular, 
since there will be no trial, there is no uncertainty about legal conclusions 𝜃1 and 
𝜃2 that needs to be taken into account. The consequences 𝐶𝑖𝑗 in this example are 
characterised in terms of years of imprisonment, denoted hereafter by PT(𝐶𝑖𝑗), 
i.e. the prison time PT associated with consequence 𝐶𝑖𝑗. We acknowledge, 
however, that this represents a simplified view, in the sense that there may be 
further aspects that characterise a decision consequence. For example, if found 
guilty, the defendant may lose his job, he may be disenfranchised etc. More 
generally, to each consequence 𝐶𝑖𝑗 is associated a utility, denoted U(𝐶𝑖𝑗), or a loss, 
denoted Lo(𝐶𝑖𝑗), quantifying or expressing the desirability or undesirability of 
the incurred outcomes, respectively. In the case at hand, the loss is assumed to 
be linear over the total range of years that can possibly result from a conviction. 
Hence, it can be set numerically equal to the years of imprisonment, that is 
Lo(𝐶𝑖𝑗) = PT(𝐶𝑖𝑗). Note, however, that losses can also be quantified differently. 
For example, the undesirability of a conviction can be measured in monetary 
terms. An example where the desirability of decision consequences is quantified 
in monetary terms is developed in Section 3.  
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Figure 1: Decision tree for a defendant’s decision problem. The square represents the 
available decisions 𝑑𝑖, i = {1, 2}. The circle represents the states of nature  𝜃𝑗 , j = {1, 2}, 
which determine the outcomes  𝐶2𝑗 if decision 𝑑2 is taken. Pr(𝜃𝑗|𝐼) represents the 
probability of state of nature 𝜃𝑗 given information I. All consequences 𝐶 are valued in 
terms of years of imprisonment. Decisions are compared on the basis of the expected 
prison time, EPT. The decision branch which does not offer the smallest EPT, here 𝑑1, 
is double crossed //.  
 
In decision trees, the above decision-theoretic elements are captured as 
shown in Figure 1. The actions available to the defendant, 𝑑1 and 𝑑2, are 
described by the two branches that emanate from the trunk, shown as a square – 
the decision node – on the far left-hand side. The circled node, also called chance 
node, represents states of nature about which the decision-maker is uncertain. 
There is a time order when going from left to right, because when deciding 𝑑2, 
two things can happen. Either, the fact-finder will find the defendant guilty, 𝜃1, 
an event thought to occur with probability 0.7, or 𝜃2, the event of finding the 
defendant not guilty, an event thought to occur with probability 0.3. At the far 
right-hand side, the terminal states 𝐶 are shown, along with their associated 
evaluation of undesirability (in the case here losses in terms of years of 
imprisonment). The chance node is labelled with the expected prison term, EPT, 
of the decision 𝑑2 whereas the squared decision node is labelled with the 
d1: accept plea
d2: go to trial
q1: guilty
q2: not guilty
C1・ : 3 years
C21: 6 years
C22: 0 years
Pr(q1 | I)=0.7
Pr(q2 | I)=0.3
EPT(d2)
4.2 years
EPT(d1)
3 years
EPT(dopt)
3 years
optimal decision and
expected prison time
of optimal decision
available
decisions
expected prison 
time
of each decision
states of nature
and probabilities
for states of 
nature
consequences 
and
associated prison
time
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expected prison term of the optimal decision 𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡. In the analysis here, it is 
considered that the optimal decision is the one which has the smallest EPT. For 
the case studied here, the EPT associated with the decision to go to trial (𝑑2), is 
4.2, and is obtained by summing over the possible states of nature the product of 
the loss associated to each consequence 𝐶𝑖𝑗 (i.e., the prison time PT(𝐶𝑖𝑗)) and the 
probability of the state of nature, that is:  
 
EPT(𝑑2) = PT(𝐶𝑖𝑗) Pr(𝜃1|𝐼) + PT(𝐶22) Pr(𝜃2|𝐼) = 6 × 0.7 + 0 × 0.3 = 4.2. 
 
The branch 𝑑1 has a smaller EPT, 3 years, which corresponds to the loss 
associated to the consequence 𝐶1∙, the reduced charge. In summary, thus 
EPT(𝑑1) < EPT(𝑑2) and it follows that the optimal decision is 𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡 = 𝑑1.13 This is 
in agreement with the assumption that the defence pursues the hypothetical 
objective of minimizing the expected length of time the defendant will be 
deprived of liberty. To some extent this helps illustrate why many defendants 
accept guilty pleas even though they may assign only a moderate or low 
                                                 
13  The elicitation of probabilities for states of nature is often considered a tedious task, since 
decision-makers are asked to translate into numbers their personal beliefs, sometimes with an 
unrealistic level of precision. However, the decision-maker can perform a sensitivity analysis 
to provide a threshold for the required probability Pr(𝜃1|𝐼) with which the optimal decision 
will change. In the current example, one may easily observe that the limiting value for Pr(𝜃1|𝐼) 
is equal to 0.5: as long as the event that the court will find the defendant guilty is considered 
to be more probable than the event that the court will render a verdict of not guilty, the optimal 
decision is 𝑑1. The assignment of losses is another intricate task. Clearly, one may observe that 
the consequence of a conviction, resulting in prison, may not be linear over the total range of 
years of imprisonment, with a decreasing aversion to prison time. It is possible to build a loss 
function in the range (0, 1), with a zero loss associated with an acquittal, and a maximum loss 
equal to 1 in the case of, for example, life imprisonment, with highly increasing losses over the 
first years, followed by a linear growth. This may obviously have an impact on the optimal 
decision, though this does not adversely affect the proposed approach as such. The fact that 
an optimal decision may vary depending on one’s assumptions and preferences does not 
imply that the implemented decisional approach is unsuitable. A decision, in the approach 
pursued here, is not optimal in absolute terms; it is optimal with respect to the decision-
maker’s preferences and uncertainties about outcomes at stake.  
Biedermann et al.  93 
probability of being convicted if the case went to trial: because the sentence in 
case of a conviction may be very severe (or perceived as such), even a low 
probability for a conviction will be sufficient to ‘outweigh’ the sentence 
associated with the guilty plea. While this is a purely formal view, we concede 
that in practice defendants may prefer a guilty plea for other reasons, too.  
Let us emphasise again that evaluating the undesirability of decision 
consequences directly in terms of prison time was a choice made for the sole 
purpose of providing an example, and that other loss functions associating a 
higher severity to adverse outcomes can be built. This may lead to losses 
expressing nearly infinitely undesirable consequences that would make going to 
trial unadvisable even in presence of a very low probability of an unfavourable 
verdict.14 Moreover, going to trial may be perceived as a highly aleatory 
undertaking, with sentence length and probabilities for verdicts being difficult to 
assess, thus making the guilty plea with its sure consequence the preferable 
option. Specifically, if the defendant refuses to quantify uncertainty (about states 
of nature; here verdicts), or refuses to run the risk of incurring the worst 
consequence associated with going to trial (especially if 𝐶21 represents a severe 
sentence), and hence accept the guilty plea (𝑑1), such a strategy would amount to 
minimising the maximum loss. This is a non-probabilistic decision criterion also 
known in literature as minimax.15 It is important to note that such an alternative 
consideration is not in conflict with the general decision theoretic approach 
                                                 
14  The reason for using the term “nearly infinitely undesirable consequences” is that the 
axiomatic foundation for the existence of a utility function we refer to requires that there do 
not exist infinitely undesirable consequences. Otherwise, no matter how small the probability 
of a conviction is, one will always prefer to avoid going to trial.  
15  E.g., Herman Chernoff and Lincoln Moses, Elementary Decision Theory (New York: John Wiley 
& Sons, 1959). 
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considered here: the basic decomposition of the decision problem outlined at the 
beginning of this section, summarised graphically in Figure 1, remains the same.  
The point of view of the prosecution may be different in that they may 
seek to maximise the expected prison time, and hence the expected length of time 
the offender is kept away from society. But again, we emphasise that there may 
be other – concurrent – objectives in prosecution decision-making, beyond the 
scope of the generic introductory example chosen here. Our current 
demonstration only focuses on a single objective and how this single objective is 
conceptualised. The reader may use other values for probabilities and losses (e.g., 
different sentence lengths) as required, but should be aware of the fact that this 
may impact on the EPT of the two decisions, and hence 𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡. For example, for 
any plea of guilty on a reduced charge greater than 4.2 years, while keeping the 
other assignments as defined above, the optimal decision is 𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡 = 𝑑2.  
2.2 Bayesian decision networks (influence diagrams) 
While decision trees (Section 2.1) provide a static summary of the main features 
of a decision analysis, such as probabilities and (expected) utilities, Bayesian 
decision networks (BDNs) provide a more flexible and dynamic, but also more 
compact modelling framework. BDNs extend Bayesian networks by including 
rectangle nodes for representing decision variables and diamonds for 
representing utility functions.16 To illustrate the main components of BDNs, 
consider again the defendant’s decision problem introduced in Section 2.1. 
Figure 2 represents the main aspects of this case in terms of a BDN. Rather than 
presenting a full and simultaneous display of all “routes” that may follow from 
a decision (as shown in Figure 1), variables in a BDN are represented by single 
                                                 
16  Kjærulff and Madsen, supra n. 7. 
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nodes. For example, instead of having a branch for each decision 𝑑𝑖 in a decision 
tree, a BDN concentrates all decisions in a single node (here node D). The 
expanded node D in Figure 2(ii) summarises the EPT associated with each 
decision 𝑑𝑖. These EPT values correspond to the values attached to the branches 
𝑑𝑖  of the decision tree (Figure 1). Note that the BDN in Figure 2 is the simplest 
possible model structure as it involves exactly one node for each node category, 
i.e. nodes for states of nature (also called chance nodes), decisions and utilities. 
More elaborate models will be introduced in later sections. Note that the links 
pointing from nodes D and 𝜃 to PT mean that the “goodness” of a decision, here 
decision 𝑑2, is dependent on the future state of nature 𝜃 (i.e., the trial outcome). 
In particular, the node PT contains a table that specifies a prison term (in years) 
for each combination of a decision 𝑑𝑖  and a trial outcome 𝜃𝑗 , for i,j = {1,2}.  
Bayesian decision networks are fairly flexible, as is illustrated by Figure 2 
(iii), which shows an alternative network structure. In this model, the states of 
nature 𝜃𝑗  depend on the decisions 𝑑𝑖. In particular, there is an additional state of 
nature 𝜃3, ‘no trial’, that is the situation in which 𝑑1 (accept plea agreement) is 
chosen. The structural relationship 𝐷 → 𝜃 thus allows us to specify probabilities 
that depend on propositions, Pr(𝜃𝑗|𝑑𝑖). So, for the case in which the defendant 
accepts the plea (𝑑1), the conditional probabilities for the states of nature θj are 
Pr(𝜃𝑗|𝑑1) = {0,0,1}, where 𝜃1=guilty, 𝜃2=not guilty and 𝜃3=no trial. And, clearly, 
if the decision is to prosecute (𝑑2), the probabilities are Pr(𝜃𝑗|𝑑2) = {0.7,0.3,0}, for 
j = {1, 2, 3}. The utility node17 PT contains the values (prison terms) 6 if 𝜃1 (guilty) 
holds, 0 if 𝜃2 (not guilty) holds and 3 if 𝜃3 (no trial) holds. Note that the latter 
                                                 
17  Note that the “utility” in this case represents, in fact, a loss. However, this has no impact on 
the optimisation strategy and the resulting decisional choice: the criterion of maximising 
expected utility will become the criterion of minimising expected prison time (i.e., loss).  
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assignment, PT(𝐶1∙) = 3, corresponds to the reduced charge associated with the 
accepted plea.  
 
 
Figure 2: Bayesian decision networks for the defendant’s decision problem introduced 
in Section 2.1. The node 𝜃 represents the uncertain states of nature (i.e., trial outcomes), 
the diamond shaped node PT the evaluation of the consequences (quantified in terms 
of prison term), and the squared node D the available actions. Figure (i) shows the 
general network structure whereas Figure (ii) shows the nodes D and 𝜃 in full detail 
for a situation in which the defendant expects a guilty verdict at the end of the process 
to occur with probability 0.7 and a not guilty verdict with probability 0.3. Node D 
shows the expected prison term (EPT) for the two decisions 𝑑2 and 𝑑2. Figure (iii) 
shows an alternative network structure leading to the same EPT, the sole difference 
being the introduction of an additional state of nature 𝜃3 to account for the situation 
of no trial being held when decision 𝑑1 is taken.   
3 Normative decision structures 
3.1 Standard model of legal negotiations 
Consider now a standard model of legal negotiations through the case of a 
hypothetical damage suit in the amount of €150,000. The plaintiff faces the 
decision of whether to accept an out-of-court settlement (decision 𝑑1), or to bring 
the lawsuit to trial (decision 𝑑2). The plaintiff can either win the case (𝜃1), or lose 
the case (𝜃2). Suppose that the plaintiff’s current assessment of his probability of 
D q
PT
d1: accept plea 3
d2: prosecute 4.2
PT
q1: guilty 0.7
q2: not guilty 0.3
(i) (ii)
d1: accept plea 3
d2: prosecute 4.2
PT
q1: guilty 0.3
q2: not guilty 0.15
q3: no trial 0.5
(iii)
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winning the case is 0.8.18 Using notation introduced above, we can write this as 
Pr(𝜃1|𝐼) = 0.8, where I denotes the plaintiff’s current state of information. By 
coherence, the probability of losing the case is Pr(𝜃2|𝐼) = 0.2, again considered 
from the plaintiff’s point of view. Note that in this case the probabilities of states 
of nature are not conditioned on decisions. For the time being, we will leave aside 
considerations of litigation costs; we will introduce these step by step later on. 
The purpose at this point is to draw the attention solely to the notion of the 
expected value of going to trial, to embody the essence of the problem. In the case 
here, we suppose that the consequence of a decision is entirely described in 
monetary terms (monetary value, MV), and that the utility function is linear so 
that the utility can be set to be numerically equal to the monetary value, that is 
U(MV(𝑑𝑖, 𝜃𝑗)) = MV(𝑑𝑖, 𝜃𝑗). Moreover, we suppose that the decision-maker is 
willing to act on the basis of expected monetary value (EMV), or at least is 
interested in this value prior to making a decision based on considerations going 
beyond those explicitly taken into account at this juncture. As in the previous 
sections, we emphasise that action based on EMV is an assumption subject to 
discussion, though it does not impact on the principle of the proposed analyses. 
It is perfectly feasible, for example, to choose another utility function to account 
for individual preferences according to which changes in the utility of very low 
or very high monetary values are not linear.  
                                                 
18  How to arrive at such probability assignments is an intricate topic in its own right and goes 
beyond the scope of this paper. Devices that can help with probability assignment are covered 
largely in specialised literature on the topic, ranging from practical approaches (e.g., 
consultation with peers, past experience in similar cases, etc.) to technical procedures based 
on chance devices (e.g., probability wheels) adapted from fields such as applied psychology 
(see, e.g., Howell Jackson et al., Analytical Methods for Lawyers (St. Paul, Mn.: Foundation Press, 
2003), pp. 27-30; Baron (2010), supra n. 10, pp. 112-113; Detlof von Winterfeldt and Ward 
Edwards, Decision Analysis and Behavioral Research (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1986), pp. 112-122).  
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In the above framework, the optimal decision 𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡 will be the one at which 
the EMV attains its maximum, that is  
 
EMV(𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡) = max
𝑖
EMV(𝑑𝑖). 
 
We can write the EMV associated with going to trial, for the plaintiff, as 
follows: 
 
EMV(𝑑2) = MV(𝑑2, 𝜃1) × Pr(𝜃1|𝐼) + MV(𝑑2, 𝜃2) ×  Pr(𝜃2|𝐼)                  (1) 
= (€ 150,000) × 0.8 +  (€ 0) × 0.2 =  € 120,000.  
 
Note that when deciding 𝑑1, there will be no trial, and the plaintiff accepts 
the out-of-court settlement as given by the monetary value x. It is not necessary 
at this point, to be explicit about x. It suffices to note that EMV(𝑑1) = 𝑥 and the 
plaintiff will decide 𝑑1 whenever EMV(𝑑1) > EMV(𝑑2), that is the settlement offer 
𝑥 > € 120,000. In other words, the plaintiff will decide to go to trial if the 
expected monetary output, that is the target amount of € 150,000, discounted by 
probability, is greater than the sure return x from the out-of-court settlement.  
3.2 Influence diagrams for the standard model of legal negotiations 
In a more realistic perspective, the MV introduced in Section 3.1 should account 
for the cost of litigation 𝑙 = L(𝑑𝑖, 𝜃𝑗), taken here as the cost incurred by legal 
representation. Other specific costs may be included in the analysis without loss 
of generality. Under the reasonable assumption of additivity, since costs are 
quantified in monetary terms, the monetary value MV can be taken as the net 
amount which the decision-maker will receive, one has  
 
MV(𝑑𝑖, 𝜃𝑗 , 𝑙) = MV(𝑑𝑖, 𝜃𝑗) − L(𝑑𝑖, 𝜃𝑗).                                         (2) 
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The expected monetary value of decision 𝑑1 will become  
 
   EMV(𝑑2) = MV(𝑑2, 𝜃1, 𝑙) × Pr (𝜃1|𝐼) + MV(𝑑2, 𝜃2, 𝑙) ×  Pr (𝜃2|𝐼) 
= ∑[MV(𝑑2, 𝜃𝑗) − L(𝑑2, 𝜃𝑗)]
2
𝑗=1
×  Pr(𝜃𝑗|𝐼).                             (3) 
 
In some circumstances, the cost of litigation can be assumed to be 
independent on the outcome of the trial, that is L(𝑑2, 𝜃1) = L(𝑑2, 𝜃2) = L(𝑑2). 
Under this assumption, expression (2) can be simplified as 
 
MV(𝑑𝑖, 𝜃𝑗 , 𝑙) = MV(𝑑𝑖 , 𝜃𝑗) − L(𝑑𝑖).                                        (4) 
 
Litigation costs will then combine naturally with the EMV by 
subtraction,19 that is:  
 
EMV(𝑑2) = [MV(𝑑2, 𝜃1) − L(𝑑2)] × Pr (𝜃1|𝐼) + [MV(𝑑2, 𝜃2) − L(𝑑2)] ×  Pr (𝜃2|𝐼) 
= ∑ MV(𝑑2, 𝜃𝑗)
2
𝑗=1
×  Pr(𝜃𝑗|𝐼) − L(𝑑2).                                                              (5) 
 
In the remainder of this paper, it will be assumed that litigation costs are 
independent of the outcome of the trial. It is possible, however, to avoid this 
                                                 
19  It is important to note that this is valid only under the assumption of linearity of the utility 
function. In fact, one has U(MV(𝑑𝑖 , 𝜃𝑗 , 𝑙)) = MV(𝑑𝑖 , 𝜃𝑗, 𝑙) = MV(𝑑𝑖 , 𝜃𝑗) − L(𝑑𝑖). If, however, the 
utility function is not linear, U(MV(𝑑𝑖 , 𝜃𝑗, 𝑙)) ≠ MV(𝑑𝑖 , 𝜃𝑗 , 𝑙) = MV(𝑑𝑖 , 𝜃𝑗) and the assumption of 
additivity cannot be made. 
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assumption and adapt the proposed BDNs accordingly as explained later in this 
section.  
One way to translate the current analysis into an influence diagram 
consists in reusing the structure of the BDN shown in Figure 2(i) and to change 
the definition of the nodes D and 𝜃 according to the elements of interest here, i.e. 
decisions 𝑑1 (out-of-court settlement) and 𝑑2 (pursue litigation), and states of 
nature 𝜃1 (win trial) and 𝜃2 (lose trial). Note also that the definition of the utility 
node, denoted G here, shorthand for “gain” understood in a broad sense as 
defined below, has changed. The resulting model is shown in Figure 3(i). Note 
that the node G contains the utility function expressed as before in terms of net 
monetary values: MV(𝑑2, 𝜃1, 𝑙) =  € 150,000 − € 20,000 = € 130,000, that is the 
“gain” of winning the trial minus the litigation cost, MV(𝑑2, 𝜃2, 𝑙) =  − € 20,000, 
i.e. no “gain” when losing the case and incurring the litigation cost, and MV(𝑑1) =
 € 𝑥, i.e. the offered out-of-court settlement. For the purpose of the current 
discussion, let x be € 90,000. Note also that when 𝑑1 is selected, there is no 
consideration of the variable 𝜃, the outcome of trial. The EMV of going to trial for 
the plaintiff’s perspective thus is:  
 
EMV(𝑑2) = (€ 150,000) × 0.8 + (€ 0) × 0.2 − € 20,000 = € 100,000.         (6) 
 
So, EMV(𝑑2) > EMV(𝑑1) and the plaintiff would refuse the out-of-court 
settlement in the amount of € 90,000. Note that we do not deal here with the 
psychological dimension of the decision, in particular the fact that people may be 
inclined to prefer an out-of-court settlement of € 90,000 that is certain (decision 
𝑑1) rather than opt for 𝑑2 which involves a probability of 0.2 to incur the litigation 
cost of € 20,000 only, and hence represent a net loss. This would require a 
different utility function to properly measure the undesirability of a net loss.  
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Figure 3: Bayesian decision networks for a standard model of legal negotiations. The 
squared decision node D has states 𝑑1 (accept out-of-court settlement) and 𝑑2 (pursue 
litigation at trial). The chance node 𝜃 has two states 𝜃1 (win trial) and 𝜃2 (lose trial). In 
Figure (i), the node G quantifies all monetary aspects (e.g., costs, settlements, etc.) of 
the consequences of decisions. In Figure (ii) and its expanded representation (iii), 
distinct nodes L, S and G are used to specify, respectively, litigation costs, out-of-court 
settlement amount and court-ordered settlement (verdict) in the event of winning trial. 
Node D in Figure (iii) shows the EMV of each decision whereas node 𝜃 shows the 
plaintiff’s probabilities for the various trial outcomes.  
 
Although being a compact model, Figure 3(i) may be impractical because 
the monetary values specified in the node G fuse different aspects of the problem, 
such as litigation costs and gain in case of succeeding at trial. To enhance clarity 
and exert better control over the different features, it is possible to introduce 
distinct utility nodes for each monetary factor. This is shown in the BDN in Figure 
3(ii) where the node D has child nodes L for the cost of litigation, and S for the 
out-of-court settlement offer. In this model, the table of the node L specifies 
− € 20,000  in the event of deciding 𝑑2 (pursuing the damage suit at trial). A 
value of € 0 is specified in the event of 𝑑1, not going to trial, because it is assumed 
that this decision will incur no further litigation costs. A value different from 0 
may be chosen, however, to account for costs of option  𝑑1 other than legal fees, 
if required. Specifying the BDN in this way using, for example, a Bayesian 
D q
GL
SD q
G
(i) (ii)
d1: out-of-court 
settlement € 90,000
d2: go to trial € 100,000
q1: win 0.8
q2: lose 0.2
GL
S
(iii)
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network software such as HUGIN,20 leads to model output shown in expanded 
version in Figure 3(iii).21 The decision node displays the EMV of the options 𝑑1 
and 𝑑2, and the chance node 𝜃 shows the plaintiff’s probabilities for the trial 
outcomes 𝜃1 and 𝜃2. It may be argued that none of these results are original, 
because they may also be obtained using paper and pencil. It is relevant, 
however, to pursue the development of these models stepwise, starting with 
simple formats, in order to lay bare their constructional logic and demonstrate 
that their output can be trusted. This represents an important preliminary step to 
more advanced network structures for which the underlying calculations, 
without computational support, become increasingly complex. The next section 
illustrates the ease with which further features can be added.  
3.3 Uncertainty about verdicts and litigation costs 
A restriction of the models introduced so far is that factors such as the amount in 
case of winning at trial (e.g., node G, Figure 3) and litigation costs are considered 
fixed or known monetary values. However, at the time of making a decision, the 
plaintiff may be uncertain about the length of the process and the court-ordered 
settlement (i.e., the amount granted in case of a verdict favourable to the 
plaintiff). We now point out how BDNs can readily handle such additional 
sources of uncertainty.  
Start by considering uncertainty about the litigation costs. These may 
crucially depend, for example, on process length and case complexity. For the 
purpose of illustration, suppose that the plaintiff considers that – given 
consideration of the case as a whole – it is more probable than not that litigation 
costs will be twice as high, that is € 40,000, rather than € 20,000 as in the previous 
                                                 
20  https://www.hugin.com; Kjærulff and Madsen, supra n. 7. 
21  Note that Figure 3 contains schematic illustrations, not screenshots of BDN software.  
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section. How does this affect the EMV of the decision 𝑑2 of going to trial? Let us 
assume that the plaintiff wishes to consider two different cases, i.e. litigation costs 
of € 20,000 with probability 0.4, and € 40,000 with probability 0.6. The reader 
may consider other amounts and associated probabilities. The expected cost of 
litigation thus is: (€ 20,000) × 0.4 + (€ 40,000) × 0.6 = € 32,000. Using this 
result in Equation (5), the EMV of going to trial for the plaintiff’s perspective thus 
becomes:  
 
EMV(𝑑2) = (€ 150,000) × 0.8 + (€ 0) × 0.2 − (€ 32,000) = € 88,000.         (7) 
 
Since the expected cost has increased by € 12,000, the EMV of decision 𝑑2 
has decreased by the same amount. In particular, note that now EMV(𝑑2) <
 EMV(𝑑1) so that the out-of-court settlement € 90,000 becomes more 
advantageous – it becomes the optimal decision – for the plaintiff, although the 
plaintiff may consider this difference to be rather small. The proposed BDN can 
be further developed to acknowledge for more realistic settlements where the 
cost of litigation is a function of the process length. For example, one may 
consider the litigation cost to be proportional to the fee per hour of a lawyer, by 
adding a node to acknowledge for the expected length of the trial.  
Next, consider uncertainty about the amount granted in case of a verdict 
favourable to the plaintiff. Assume, for example, that the party considers three 
possible amounts granted or court verdicts, € 100,000, € 150,000 and € 200,000, 
with associated probabilities 0.3, 0.6 and 0.1. Thus, the fixed MV(𝑑2, 𝜃1) in 
Equation (5) must be replaced by the expected monetary value, that is the sum of 
the three outcomes weighted by their probability, that is (€ 100,000) × 0.3 +
(€ 150,000) × 0.6 + (€ 200,000) × 0.1 = € 140,000. Inserting this result in 
Equation (5) gives:  
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EMV(𝑑2) = (€ 140,000) × 0.8 + (€ 0) × 0.2 − (€ 32,000) = € 80,000.         (8) 
 
Thus, uncertainty about the amount of the court-ordered settlement has 
led to a further decrease of the EMV, in addition to that incurred by uncertainty 
about legal fees, so that there is now a more clear-cut difference with respect to 
the EMV of 𝑑1, which is given by the out-of-court settlement amount of € 90,000.  
To track the above results in a BDN, consider an extension of the model in 
Figure 3(ii), shown here in Figure 4. This network contains an additional node L′ 
with two states 40,000 and 60,000 to which unconditional probabilities 0.4 and 
0.6 are assigned. This node models the different litigation costs and the plaintiff’s 
probabilities for these costs in case decision 𝑑2 is made. Adding node L′ as a 
parent for L requires a modification of the node table of L so that it will copy the 
negative value22 of the current state of L′ when the condition 𝐷 = 𝑑2 holds, and 
the value 0 otherwise. Software environments such as Hugin offer a rich syntax 
(e.g., if-then expressions) to define functions in this way. Similarly, there is an 
additional node G′, acting as a parent node for G. The states of G′ correspond to 
the different court-ordered settlements, whereas the associated node probability 
table contains the plaintiff’s probabilities for those outcomes in the event decision 
𝑑2 is made. The node table of G is defined23 such that it copies the current value 
of G′ in the case where both 𝐷 = 𝑑2 and 𝜃1 holds, and the value 0 otherwise.  
 
 
                                                 
22  A negative value is specified here because in Hugin utility nodes are considered as additive 
contributions to the utility function.  
23  In Hugin syntax, an expression such as if(and(D=="d2",theta=="win"),Gprime,0) may be used, 
where D, theta and Gprime correspond to the internal names of the nodes D, 𝜃 and G′.  
Biedermann et al.  105 
 
Figure 4: Extended BDNs for a standard model of legal negotiations. The nodes D, 𝜃, 
S, L and G are defined as in Figure 3. Nodes L′ and G′ are extensions to deal with 
uncertainty about, respectively, litigation costs and the trial verdict.  
 
Figure 4(ii) shows a schematic illustration of the compiled network. The 
node G′ is fixed (i.e., instantiated) to the state € 150,000, highlighted with a bold 
border line. This corresponds to a situation in which there is no uncertainty about 
the court-ordered verdict. In turn, the node L′ is left uninstantiated so as to allow 
for uncertainty about the litigation costs. For such a situation, the node D shows 
that the EMV of decision 𝑑2 is € 88,000, which corresponds to the value found 
through Equation (7). The network shown in Figure 4(iii) shows a situation that 
allows for uncertainty about the court-ordered settlement, which is achieved by 
leaving the node G′ uninstantiated. The EMV of decision 𝑑2 then is € 80,000, 
which corresponds to the result given by Equation (8).  
3.4 The notion of perfect information (PI) 
The previous sections have illustrated that the major factor rendering decision-
making hard is uncertainty about the state of nature 𝜃, for if we knew whether 
𝜃1 (win) or 𝜃2 (lose) holds, choosing between 𝑑1 and 𝑑2 is more straightforward. 
In the special case where other factors (e.g., litigation costs) could be considered 
fixed (i.e., without uncertainty), it would even be possible to tell which decision 
would offer the most desirable outcome within the stated modelling 
assumptions. Therefore, any information capable of reducing uncertainties about 
the states of nature, that is directing associated probabilities towards 0 and 1, is 
of particular interest to decision-makers. One notion that is often encountered in 
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this context is perfect information (PI). This represents an element that is 
completely informative about the propositions of interest (i.e., information that 
would allow one to know which proposition is true). A crucial question is, 
however, how valuable such data or information is. This question is pursued 
below. Although it may be considered a hypothetical question, it is useful as a 
starting point for thinking about the more general issue of data that are only 
partially informative (i.e., imperfect). Such data do not allow us to establish with 
complete certainty which state of nature actually holds, a property that typically 
applies to forensic science results.  
Perfect information can lead to two different outcomes. In one case, perfect 
information would establish 𝜃1, i.e. winning the case. The best decision then is 
𝑑2, pursuing the dispute, because the outcome will be a verdict of € 150,000, 
from which the litigation costs of € 20,000 must be subtracted. The second 
possibility is that perfect information establishes 𝜃2, in which case decision 𝑑2 
would incur the litigation costs of € 20,000, and no “gain”, whereas 𝑑1 would 
lead to the out-of-court settlement of € 90,000 (a situation in which no litigation 
cost is assumed). But again, the states of nature are unknown, so at best one can 
consider one’s expected outcome (monetary value) with perfect information 
(EMVPI), defined as follows:  
 
EMVPI = ∑[max
𝑖
(MV(𝑑𝑖, 𝜃𝑗) − L(𝑑𝑖))]
2
𝑗=1
× Pr(𝜃𝑗|𝐼).                               (9)      
 
In the example considered here, this results in (€ 90,000 − € 20,000) ×
0.8 + (€ 90,000) × 0.2 = € 122,000. Stated otherwise, the expected outcome with 
perfect information is obtained by summing over the possible states of nature (or 
outcomes) the maximum net monetary value – that is the monetary outcome 
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associated with the optimal decision – weighted by the probability of the state of 
nature.24  
The EMVPI can be compared to the EMV of the optimal decision without 
perfect information. For a case in which the verdict is taken to be constant at 
€ 150,000, and the litigation cost fixed to € 20,000, the decision 𝑑2 was found to 
be optimal, with an EMV of € 100,000, found through Equation (6) and also 
shown in Figure 3(iii). The result of this comparison is the expected value of perfect 
information (EVPI), that is € 22,000. It is often referred to as the maximum price 
that one should be willing to pay for obtaining such perfect information. More 
formally, it is defined as follows:  
 
EVPI = EMVPI−EMV(𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡).                                                   (10) 
 
where dopt is the optimal decision without additional information, also 
sometimes called the a priori optimal action.  
The EVPI does not correspond to a particular state of a BDN, and hence 
cannot directly be read off the graph.25 Rather, Equation (10) shows that the EVPI 
is the result of a comparison of different situations, and those can be displayed 
separately. As is illustrated by Figure 5, for example, one can determine the 
optimal decisions and their associated EMVs under assumptions of perfect 
information, which is needed to calculate the EMVPI, as part of the EVPI. The 
added value of BDNs thus is to provide a unified environment in which one can 
break down abstract formulae, such as Equation (9), into their constituting 
                                                 
24  Note that the procedure is general and also holds for n hypotheses.  
25 Note, however, that some graphical probability software packages (e.g., Hugin) offer built-in 
functions to perform value of information analyses.  
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components, which may otherwise be more difficult to achieve, and more prone 
to error.  
 
 
Figure 5: Extended BDNs for a standard model of legal negotiations. The nodes D, 𝜃, 
S, L and G are defined as in Figure 3. Nodes L′ and G′ are extensions to deal with 
uncertainty about, respectively, litigation costs and the verdict, fixed here to € 20,000 
and € 150,000, respectively. Figure (i) shows a situation in which it is supposed that 
perfect information about the state of nature is available, in particular that 𝜃1 holds 
(node shown with grey shading). The optimal decision in this case is 𝑑2, leading to a 
MV of € 130,000. In Figure (ii), the state 𝜃2 is supposed to hold. In this case the optimal 
decision is  𝑑1 with outcome € 90,000. All instantiated nodes are highlighted with a 
bold border line.  
3.5 Expected value of partial information (pI) 
In legal practice, it is often the case that a party has the option of seeking further 
evidence that may have a bearing on the assessment of probabilities for trial 
outcomes. Typically, information that may be gathered in real cases is not such 
as to establish clear-cut values of 0 and 1 for the probabilities of the states of 
nature as is supposed by perfect information (Section 3.4). Let us denote such 
evidence partial information (pI).26 To assess the expected value of less than perfect 
information, one needs to consider the effect that partial information has on one’s 
probabilities for the relevant states of nature 𝜃. Given the probabilistic graphical 
                                                 
26  Here, the lower-case letter “p” denotes “partial” as compared to the capital letter “P” used to 
denote “perfect” in Section 3.4.  
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modelling framework used in this paper, this operation is naturally operated 
through Bayes’ theorem.27 The procedure is outlined below. A forensic example 
is given in Section 3.6.  
Consider first that the optimal decision 𝑑 with partial information E, say 
𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡|𝐸, is the one that maximises the EMV calculated on the basis of the posterior 
probabilities for the trial outcomes 𝜃 once the partial information E is available, 
say Pr(𝜃|𝐸). Formally, thus, 𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡|𝐸  is the decision at which the EMV attains its 
maximum:  
 
EMV(𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡|𝐸) = max
𝑖
EMV(𝑑𝑖|𝐸)                                                                              (11) 
= max
𝑖
∑[MV(𝑑𝑖, 𝜃𝑗) − L(𝑑𝑖)] × Pr(𝜃𝑗|𝐸)
2
𝑗=1
. 
 
For shortness of notation only, we leave aside relevant information I from 
notation and assume that there are fixed monetary values for the trial verdict in 
case of winning, that is MV(𝑑2, 𝜃1), and the litigation costs L(𝑑2). Also, the out-
of-court settlement has a fixed value MV(𝑑1), which is independent of 𝜃, with no 
associated litigation cost.  
Equation (11) provides the guide to action in case the decision-maker 
knows what kind of information E has been obtained, and hence posterior 
probabilities Pr(𝜃𝑗|𝐸) are available. However, information E may take various 
different forms (i.e., 𝐸𝑘, for k=1,2,...,n), so that prior to obtaining E the decision-
maker should take into account these possible outcomes 𝐸𝑘, along with an 
                                                 
27  For the purpose of this paper, it is not necessary to go into the technical details of operating 
Bayes’ theorem because this is a feature incorporated by default in Bayesian (decision) 
networks (e.g., Uffe Kjærulff and Anders Madsen (2008), supra n. 7). 
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expression of the associated uncertainty, in terms of probabilities. This leads to 
the expected monetary value with partial information (EMVpI):  
 
EMVpI = ∑ max
𝑖
EMV(𝑑𝑖|𝐸) × Pr(𝐸)                                             (12)
𝐸
 
 
Equation (12) involves the multiplication of results in (11) by Pr(𝐸) over 
the various possible forms that the information E can take.28 The difference 
between this result and the EMV without information E is the expected value of 
partial information (EVpI):  
 
EVpI = EMVpI − max
𝑖
EMV(𝑑𝑖),                                                 (13) 
 
where max
𝑖
EMV(𝑑𝑖) is EMV(𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡), prior to the partial information E.  
3.6 Example: EMV of partial forensic information 
To illustrate the consideration of partial information with a forensic connotation, 
suppose that E refers to the report of a forensic document examiner. Forensic 
document examinations focus on a variety of aspects, such as physical document 
examinations or comparative handwriting examinations. The results of such 
examinations may help inform about document authenticity, for example, which 
may be a key issue in a litigation case. Assume that the conclusion of the report 
of the forensic scientists takes one of the following three different forms: findings 
(i.e., evidence) favourable to the plaintiff (𝐸1), neutral findings (i.e., favouring 
                                                 
28  Note that the sum in Equation (12) may be replaced by an integral to deal with continuous 
evidence. In this latter case, the probability of the evidence will be replaced by a probability 
density.  
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neither party; 𝐸2), and findings favourable to the defendant (𝐸3). Note that this is 
a general way of looking at the forensic scientist’s work, comparable to that of 
other specialists and consultants that may be contacted as part of the legal 
process.  
What exactly forensic and other specialists are consulted for is a crucial 
point that is worthy to be defined in more detail. In particular, we emphasize that 
the issue here is not the use of results of forensic examinations to help inform 
about intermediate propositions such as “the questioned document was signed 
by the defendant” versus “an unknown person signed the questioned 
document”, or “the questioned document was printed with the defendant’s 
device” versus “an unknown printer was used”. Such propositions are used in 
conventional evaluations of forensic results.29 Here a different uncertain 
proposition is of interest: it is the outcome of the lawsuit, denoted 𝜃, which is the 
uncertain event bearing on the decision analysis.30  
The decision analyst thus is directed to think about how the forensic report 
E informs the party about θ, the verdict at the end of the trial. Let us emphasise 
again that the question here is not one of weight of evidence for results of forensic 
examinations, a notion concerned with propositions representing competing 
versions of an event of interest. The focus here is the impact on verdicts, i.e. how 
a given forensic conclusion will impact, as judged by the litigant, the relative 
probabilities of the two possible ultimate trial outcomes. In a formal framework, 
                                                 
29  Colin Aitken and Franco Taroni, Statistics and the Evaluation of Evidence for Forensic Scientists, 
2nd ed. (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 2004); Franco Taroni et al., Data Analysis in Forensic 
Science: a Bayesian Decision Perspective (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 2010); see also supra n. 
12. 
30  It is worth noting, though, that some propositions of interest when evaluating forensic results 
(e.g., “the questioned signature is authentic”) are closely related to ultimate propositions (e.g., 
liability).  
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a logical way to track this question is through Bayes’ theorem. With the prior 
probabilities Pr(𝜃), obtaining the posterior probabilities Pr(𝜃|𝐸) requires the 
consideration of the probabilities for E given 𝜃, Pr(𝐸|𝜃). Suppose the following 
values: Pr(𝐸𝑖|𝜃1) = {0.9,0.05,0.05} and Pr(𝐸𝑖|𝜃2) = {0.1,0.05,0.85}, for i = 1, 2, 3. 
These assignments express the view that a forensic finding favourable to the 
plaintiff (𝐸1) is more probable if the case in fact turns out favourably for the plain- 
tiff (𝜃1), rather than unfavourably (𝜃2). The assignment also conveys the view that 
a result unfavourable for the plaintiff (𝐸3) is more probable if the case in fact turns 
out unfavourably for the plaintiff (𝜃2), rather than favourably. It is also 
considered that a “neutral” forensic result (𝐸2) is obtained with the same 
probability under each state of nature 𝜃. Note that these probabilities are also 
sometimes interpreted as a consideration of an expert’s reliability. This is 
comparable to other contexts where, for example, expert evidence is used to 
inform about states of nature such as the presence or absence of oil or gas on a 
potential mining site, or the commercial success of a new product introduced on 
the market.  
Clearly, finding the EVpI through Equation (13) with the above 
assignments is a tedious task. However, we can illustrate the support provided 
by computationally implemented Bayesian decision networks. They can either 
break down the computation into smaller chunks or even provide the result in a 
single step. The latter may be preferable if efficiency is required, whereas the 
former may be of interest if intermediate results (e.g., the optimal decision and 
associated EMV for a given result E) need to be inspected. This may be valuable 
when consulting with a client because it will allow the analyst to work through 
the decision network together with the client to demonstrate how the optimal 
decision may change in different circumstances, and that the analyst has 
seriously assessed each aspect of the client’s case. Below, we briefly outline both 
routes.  
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Start by considering the computation of parts of the EVpI using the BDN 
shown in Figure 6(i). It contains an additional chance node for the possible 
forensic findings E, specified as a child node of 𝜃 (trial outcome). The conditional 
probabilities Pr(𝐸|𝜃) are as assigned above. Figure 6(i) shows the BDN in its 
initial state, with nodes G′ and L′ fixed to, respectively,  € 20K and € 150K. The 
node E shows the marginal probabilities for the various forms that the forensic 
report may take. These values are one element needed for the EMVpI (Equation 
(12). Further elements are posterior probabilities for 𝜃 and the EMV of the 
optimal decision given a particular posterior probability distribution over 𝜃.31 
This is illustrated in Figure 6(ii) for the situation in which the outcome 𝐸1, a 
favourable forensic report (for the plaintiff’s position), is obtained: it is shown 
that the posterior probability Pr(𝜃1|𝐸1) increases to 0.973 and the optimal 
decision is 𝑑2, with an EMV of € 125,946. One can proceed analogously for the 
potential outcomes 𝐸2 (neutral forensic report) and 𝐸3 (unfavourable forensic 
report). Applying the results in Equation (12) leads to the EMVpI of € 117,100. 
Comparing this result with the EMV € 100K of the optimal decision without 
partial information, shown in Figure 6(i), gives the EVpI of € 17,100. For a 
summary of the computation of the EMVpI, see also Table 1. Note that this listing 
of the various outcomes and the optimal decisions in each of these cases is also 
sometimes referred to as a policy.  
 
 
 
                                                 
31  Again, these probabilities are obtained through Bayes’ theorem (see also supra n. 27). 
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Figure 6: Bayesian decision network previously defined in Figure 4, extended here 
with a child node for 𝜃, representing the scope of results E given by a forensic 
scientist’s report. Figure (i) shows the initial state of the network with litigation costs 
fixed at € 20K and the verdict fixed at € 150K. Figure (ii) shows a situation in which a 
forensic report favourable to the defendant is obtained. This is highlighted with a grey 
shaded node, instantiated to 𝐸1. The forensic information 𝐸1 leads to posterior 
probabilities for the trial outcomes 𝜃 and an EMV of € 125,946 for the optimal decision 
𝑑2.  
  
Forensic result E Pr (𝜃1|𝐸𝑖) 𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡|𝐸 EMV(𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡|𝐸) EMV(𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡|𝐸) × Pr(𝐸) 
𝐸1(favourable) {0.973,0.027} 𝑑2 € 125,946 € 93,200 
𝐸2(neutral) {0.8,0.2} 𝑑2 € 100,000 € 5,000 
𝐸3(unfavourable) {0.19,0.81} 𝑑1 € 90,000 € 18,900 
Total: € 117,100 
 
Table 1: Illustration of the computation of the EMVpI. For each forensic result 𝐸𝑖, 
i={1,2,3}, the columns two to five contain, respectively, the posterior probabilities 
{Pr (𝜃1|𝐸𝑖), Pr (𝜃2|𝐸𝑖)}, the a posteriori optimal decision (𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡), their associated EMV, 
and the EMV discounted by the marginal probability of the finding 𝐸𝑖. The total value 
in column five gives the EMVpI (Equation (12)).  
 
The direct computational step to obtain the EVpI for the forensic report E 
is shown in Figure 7, using the “Value of information” functionality of the 
software Hugin. The EVpI can be retrieved in an information pane while keeping 
d1: out-of-court 
settlement € 90,000
d2: go to trial € 100,000
q1: win 0.8
q2: lose 0.2
GL
S
(i)
100,000 0.0
150,000 1.0
200,000 0.0
20,000 1.0
40,000 0.0
E1: favourable 0.74
E2: neutral 0.05
E3: unfavourable 0.21
d1: out-of-court 
settlement € 90,000
d2: go to trial € 125,946
q1: win 0.973
q2: lose 0.027
GL
S
(ii)
100,000 0.0
150,000 1.0
200,000 0.0
20,000 1.0
40,000 0.0
E1: favourable 1.0
E2: neutral 0.0
E3: unfavourable 0.0
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track of other key values shown in monitor windows besides nodes in the 
network (e.g., EMV of the a priori optimal action, here 𝑑2, which is € 100K).  
 
 
Figure 7: Illustration of a computerized implementation of the Bayesian decision 
network as defined and instantiated in Figure 6(i) (i.e., litigation costs fixed at € 20K 
and the verdict settlement fixed at € 150K), using the software Hugin Researcher (vers. 
8.6). The information pane shows the result of a value of information analysis for the 
decision variable representing the plaintiff’s decision of bringing or not the damage 
suit to trial. The result of the analysis, € 117,100, is the EVpI, the expected value of 
partial information. Here, partial information refers to the forensic report. It 
corresponds to the result obtained in Section 3.6, and is given by the difference 
between the EMVpI (that can be found in, or that has been reconstructed step by step 
in Table 1) and the EMV of the a priori optimal action (here, € 100K, shown also in the 
monitor window of the decision node “Go to trial?”).  
3.7 Sequential decision-making and normative decision policies 
So far we have considered a formal way of thinking about the value of a single 
item of information in the context of making an important decision, illustrated 
through the example of a hypothetical litigation case. This analysis can be taken 
a step further and be reflected on from the perspective of sequential decision-
making. In the currently discussed example, the decision about whether or not 
to obtain forensic information is made before making a decision about bringing 
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the damage suit to trial. Thus, there is a sequence of decisions. In terms of a 
Bayesian decision network, the decision about obtaining or not forensic 
information can be represented by adding an additional decision node, denoted 
F here, as a parent for the node E. The values of the node F are “acquire forensic 
information (𝑓1)” and “do not acquire forensic information (𝑓2)”. The node F has 
a utility node K as a child, in order to account for the cost of the forensic 
information. The chance node K′ deals with uncertainty about these costs as done 
previously for the nodes G′ and L′. Figure 8 summarises the network. Note that 
there are additional edges with dotted lines. One edge is a precedence link and 
goes from the decision node F to the decision node D. This indicates the temporal 
order that decision F precedes decision D. Another edge, an information link, 
goes from E to D. This dotted edge indicates that the state of the variable E is 
known before the ultimate decision D is made. These semantic aspects are also 
known as the no-forgetting assumption: the decision-maker perfectly recalls all 
“experiments” and decisions made in the past.  
 
 
 
Figure 8: Bayesian decision network previously defined in Figures 4 and 6, extended 
here by a decision node F with states “acquire forensic information” (denoted 𝑓1 in the 
main body of the text) and “do not acquire forensic information” (denoted 𝑓2). The 
utility node K models the cost of acquiring forensic information, whereas the node K′ 
models different costs in the same way as is done by the nodes G′ and L′.  
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The definition of the node E has slightly been changed, by adding a further 
state called “no result”. It accounts for the situation in which the node F takes the 
value “do not acquire forensic information (𝑓2)”. The definition of the conditional 
probability table for the node E from Section 3.6 is modified to Pr(𝐸𝑖|𝜃1, 𝐹 = 𝑓1) =
{0.9,0.05,0.05,0} and Pr(𝐸𝑖|𝜃2, 𝐹 = 𝑓1) = {0.1,0.05,0.85,0}, for i = 1,2,3,4. In case of 
𝐹 = 𝑓2, not acquiring forensic information, we specify Pr(𝐸𝑖|𝐹 = 𝑓2) = {0,0,0,1}, 
regardless of the state of the node 𝜃.  
Implementing the Bayesian decision network shown in Figure 8 in a 
graphical modelling software, such as Hugin, allows one to conduct a variety of 
analyses. A first important question is: “Should forensic information be 
acquired?”. To answer this question, we need the EMV(𝑓1). In Hugin, this value 
can be obtained by using the iterative algorithm called “Single Policy Update”. 
As shown in Figure 9 (top), the value obtained is 117,000, which corresponds to 
the EMVpI found at the end of Section 3.6 (see also Table 1). This value is greater 
than the EMV 100,000 for not conducting forensic analyses (not shown in Figure 
9). Note that the cost for the forensic analyses has been set to zero here in order 
to allow for a direct comparison of the output with the results obtained in Section 
3.6.  
Following the decision to acquire forensic analyses (decision node F), the 
next question will be whether or not to bring the case to trial (decision D). This 
second decision is considered here to depend on the outcome of the forensic 
report. To help with this question, consider again Figure 9 (top). The monitor 
window of the node E (“Forensic report”) shows the probabilities for obtaining 
the various reports outcomes 𝐸𝑖, for i = 1, ..., 4, as well as the EMV of the optimal 
terminal decision at the node D (“Go to trial?”). As may be seen, these values 
correspond to the EMV(𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡) obtained in column 4 of Table 1. Note, however, 
that the optimal decisions 𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡 vary: for a favourable (𝐸1) and a neutral (𝐸2) 
report, the optimal decision is 𝑑2 (go to trial); for an unfavourable report (𝐸3), the 
(2020) 17:1 SCRIPTed 83  118 
optimal decision is 𝑑1, accepting the out-of-court settlement offer. The EMV of 
the latter decision can readily recognised to be 90,000, as defined in Section 3.2. 
The optimal decisions for the node D (“Go to trial?”) given each outcome 𝐸𝑖 are 
summarised in a so- called policy table, as shown at the bottom of Figure 9 (top). 
This table contains the value 1 for the optimal decision, and 0 otherwise. Figure 
9 (bottom) illustrates the state of the network after obtaining a favourable forensic 
report and communicating this information to the network. The optimal decision 
in such a situation is to bring the case to trial, decision 𝑑2, with EMV 125,946.  
A particular feature of the semantics of the Bayesian decision network 
considered here is the notion of “decision past”. A decision node in a Bayesian 
decision network has a decision past that includes the parents of the decision 
node of interest, as well as the previous decisions in the decision sequence with 
their parents. A policy for a decision node in a Bayesian decision network 
specifies a decision for any possible configuration of the decision past of the 
decision node of interest. Here, a configuration means a possible combination of 
decisions and observations made prior to making the decision of interest. In 
Table 2 we specify different decision pasts for the node D (“Go to trial?”), and 
associated policies. We refer to them as normative decision policies.  
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Figure 9: Bayesian decision network defined in Figure 8, implemented in the software 
Hugin: state of the network after a single policy update and the display of a policy 
table for the decision node “Go to trial?” (top); state of the network after instantiating 
the node F (“Do forensic analyses?”) to “𝑓1: acquire forensic information” and node E 
(“Forensic report”) to “𝐸1: favourable report”, respectively (bottom).  
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Do forensic 
analyses? Forensic report EMV(𝑑1|𝐸𝑖) EMV(𝑑2|𝐸𝑖) 
Optimal 
decision 
yes 𝐸1: favourable 90,000 125,946 𝑑2: go to trial 
yes 𝐸2: neutral 90,000 100,000 𝑑2: go to trial 
yes 𝐸3: unfavourable 90,000 8,571 𝑑1: settle 
no 𝐸4: no result 90,000 100,000 𝑑2: go to trial 
 
Table 2: Normative decision policy table for the node D (“Go to trial?”, column 5) and 
different decision pasts, defined by the previous decision, node F (“Do forensic 
analyses?”, column 1), and the outcome E (“Forensic report”, column 2). Maximum 
expected monetary values are shown in bold. Each row in the table represents a policy.  
4 Discussion and conclusions 
Traditionally, scholarly literature on how to manage information in the legal 
process has largely gravitated around questions of probative value of the 
evidence in the case at hand. In particular, it has focused on whether and to what 
extent evidence has discriminative capacity with respect to the competing 
propositions presented by the parties at trial, and how evidence impacts the 
ultimate issue on which factfinders need to render a decision. However, this 
emphasis on the fact-finders’ perspective is only a small part of the broad scope 
of weight-of-evidence and decision-making issues that the various participants 
in the legal process encounter. For example, litigants may need to decide whether 
or not to go to trial, and whether or not to look for additional information before 
taking further legal action. Most often, such questions are thought about and 
formulated in a verbal and qualitative way; this is often felt to be insufficient 
because of the high stakes involved, which can be quantified to at least some 
extent (e.g., in monetary terms). Costs for legal representation and ongoing 
enquiries raise questions such as “how much should we be willing to pay for 
additional information?” or “what is the (expected) value of additional 
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information?”. The legal context in which such questions are raised being highly 
complex, and information coming in natural language, formal approaches to 
analysing case-tailored legal strategies are a pending challenge, as demonstrated 
by the numerous directions that research has taken around the notions of 
artificial intelligence and legal analytics.32  
The formal modelling approach presented in this paper aims to cope with 
the above challenges, though it is important to be clear about a few key 
characteristics of our analyses.  
• First and foremost, the computational models we describe are not 
autonomous systems. Any decision-analytic model needs to be built for 
the specific needs of the case at hand, and requires choices to be made by 
the decision analyst on (i) which variables to include in the analysis (e.g., 
litigation costs), (ii) the general level of detail at which the decision 
problem is to be approached (e.g., which uncertainty factors ought to be 
included) and (iii) assessments of probabilities and utilities. Though 
generic template structures may be given (e.g., the standard model for 
legal negotiations, Section 3.1), they need to be adapted to the particular 
needs of the case of application. Thus, the normative decision structures 
discussed in this paper are not attempts at replacing decision analysts, but 
are intended to support analysts in their probabilistic thinking and 
decision making, using formal theories, at a level of sophistication that 
may become unfeasible or discouraging without computational support.  
• The graphical modelling language and its possibilities for computational 
implementations are both rigorous and liberal concepts: they are rigorous 
                                                 
32  E.g., Kevin Ashley, Artificial Intelligence and Legal Analytics, New Tools for Law Practice in the 
Digital Age (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2017).  
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in the sense that they capture relevance relationships among fundamental 
elements of decision problems in a logically sound way (i.e., in agreement 
with principles of probability and decision theory), and they are liberal in 
that they can cope with various levels of detail at which the analyst is 
willing to operate.  
• The proposed decision analytic structures are normative in that they assert 
coherence, i.e. conformity with probability and decision-theoretic 
principles. They are not generally normative, but only with respect to the 
elements specifically taken into account in the given case and at the level 
of detail chosen by the analyst. Although the elements included in an 
analysis are supposed to be those deemed most crucial, we do not consider 
the normative answers to be prescriptive because litigants may 
deliberately choose actions that are not considered optimal in the sense 
understood in the normative analysis. For example, litigants may seek to 
engage in legal action despite the fact that the monetary prospects of their 
decisions are not optimal, because it helps them attain other objectives, 
such as damaging their opponent’s reputation. The role of normative 
analyses is to provide a point of comparison against which decision-
makers can compare their reasoning, prior to actually making a decision, 
so as to gain a better awareness as to what exactly their choices entail, and 
compare their (intuitive) choices to the results of formal decision-theoretic 
analyses.  
Criticism is recurrently raised against formal modelling approaches in legal 
analytics. One critique is levelled at the concept of probability as used in this 
paper, for example, when assessing a party’s considerations of how a verdict will 
turn out. Practitioners may dislike the particular numerical form in which the 
proposed models employ probability, though fundamentally the notion of 
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probability cannot be dissociated from litigants’ case analyses: their 
considerations necessarily imply an assessment of the prospect of winning a 
given case.33 However, there are potential solutions to this problem, as is 
illustrated, for example, by research efforts into models of “forecasting” (or, 
“predicting”) legal outcomes.34 These may assist in providing probabilistic 
assessments for input values of the decision-theoretic models developed in this 
paper. Note, however, that such research currently focuses on selected court 
levels (e.g., U.S. Supreme Court) and requires considerable past data. In any 
event, an assessment – probabilistic or otherwise – of particular court outcomes 
is not the end of the matter: once a given assessment for legal outcomes in the 
case at hand is obtained, the practitioner still has to choose a course of action. 
This question, as we have argued throughout this paper, requires consideration 
of the various decision consequences and their relative merit from the litigant’s 
personal point of view. The decision-theoretic modelling approach presented 
here have several advantages to capture such thinking. For example, clients may 
want to obtain from their attorney an assessment that is based on more than just 
an attorney’s reference to past experience or performance. Using a formal model, 
attorneys (possibly assisted by decision-analysts familiar with the technicalities 
of the method) can demonstrate that they have seriously considered the key 
aspects of a case when suggesting a given course of action. Computationally 
implemented decision-theoretic models also provide visual support to help 
clarify the expected outcomes of different litigation strategies. This can be of 
                                                 
33  For arguments in favour of efforts to elicit numerical probabilities in litigation analysis see, 
e.g., Marc Victor, “The Proper Use of Decision Analysis to Assist Litigation Strategy” (1985) 
40 The Business Lawyer 617–629. 
34  For a recent example and overview see, e.g., Daniel Katz, Michael Bommarito and Josh 
Blackman, “A General Approach for Predicting the Behavior of the Supreme Court of the 
United States” (2017) 12(4) PLOS ONE 1-18. 
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interest to legal practitioners who seek to ensure that their clients are an integral 
part of the process of litigation strategy development.  
But still, the quantitative assessment of the relative (un-)desirability of 
decision consequences and the partial nature of decision-theoretic models with 
respect to the broad complexity of practical decision problems also invite 
criticism, with regards to practicality. While this is a valid argument, the same 
problems are even more acute when these challenges are dealt with in an 
intuitive and formally unaided way. Thus, the computational model structures 
discussed in this paper contribute to the variety of approaches available to legal 
practitioners who must constantly assess how they can improve the quality of 
advice provided to their clients, which is also a critical topic for current legal 
educational curricula.35  
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